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Summary findings
Despite  the satisfaacory  performance  of several intensely  the face of adverse  and harsh external circumstanres  and
adjusting  Sub-Saharan  African  countries  - and successful  domestic  political pressures.
results  in agriculture and food production - the overall  What is less  clear, and thus invokes  controversy,  is the
results  of adjustment achieved  in Africa  have so far beeh  speed,  timing,  and sequencing  of adjustment  programs.
modest.  Adjustment  has not yet succeeded  in raising  the  As each reform has a different impact on the various
rate of growth enough to make major inroads in  segments  of the population  - creating winners and
reducing  poverty.  losers  - mediating  among these conflicting  claims  is
Sub-Saharan  Africa's economic  recovery  is still fragile.  highly  political.  There are no technocratic  solutions or
Currency  deprediation  and inflationary  pressures have  quick fixes to provide satisfactory  solutions.  No amount
not yet been fully  subdued in several counrries  because  of  of external assistance  can help in this process.
persistence  of underlying  expansionary  fiscal  and  Consensus-building,  open communication,  consultations,
monetary policies.  Many Sub-Saharan  countries still rely  and debate - and reaching compromises  - will bring
exclusively  on external grants and concessional  financing  about the durable results.  But in practice, this path has
to close  tneir fiscal  gaps. Per capita consumption remains  proved  difficult.
stagnant, and private investment  has not yet revived.  It is equally  clear that adjustment policies,  even when
Unemployment  rates are still high, particularly  in urban  they are put in place after reaching  internal consensus,
areas, and poverty is on the rise-  When there is civil  will not lift African  countries out of poverty. The agenda
strife, adjustment, of course, has not worked.  of policy  reforms should be considered  as part of the
There is a general consensus  that consisrent  and  broader long-term development  strategy  of each country.
unfettered implementation  of adjustment  policies  and  This st'ategy should aim not only  at changes  in policies,
attainment of macroeconomic  stability  do improve the  but aiaO  at improving  investment  in human resources  and
outlook for growth in Africa.  But the record of  physical  infrastructure,  accelerating  opportunities for
implementation  is mixed  and uneven.  Adjustment  is  private sector development,  enhancing  the quality  of
necessary  even if it is bound to work slowly.  But for it to  governance,  strengthening  institutional  capacity,  and -
work at all depends on the strong commitment  by  most important - maintaining  national solidarity  and
leaders of these countries to sustain  reform policies  in  social  cohesion.
This  paper  - a product  of the Office  of the Chief  Economist,  Africa  Regional  Office  - is  based  on a recent  study  on adjustment
in  Africa.  Copies  of  this paper  are available  free from  the World  Bank,  1818  H StreerNW,  Washington,  DC  20433. Please  contact
joy Schwartz,  room  J5-255,  extension  32250 (22  pages).  October  1994.
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demelopment  issu  An objectv  of theserie is  tog  the  findings  outqucly, even f the presentationsare  less  than  fully polisied  IThe
papers  caoy the names  of the authors  and should be used and cited accordingly.  The fding,  intcrpretations,  and condusions  are  the
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After a prolonged  period of economic  stagnation,  many African countries  committed
themselves  in the mid-1980s  to a series of adjustment  policies  aimed at restoring  economic
growth.  Now, almost a  decade into adjustment,  Africa's economic  climate still remains
unclear  and uncertain,  with the overall  results  modest  relative  to original  expectations.
Although some countries have enjoyed a  resurgence of  growth,  the  economic
performance  of the region  as a whole  has  been disappointing,  raising  troubling  questions  about
the extent  and efficacy  of policy  reform  efforts. Previous  studies  of structural  adjustment  have
focused  on cross-sectional  and aggregate  performance  of a group of counties that have taken
adjustment  loans from the World Bank and the IMF.  Few empirical  studies have actually
measured the  extent to  which policies have,  in  fact,  been implemented by  the  countres
themselves  and then related  changes  in policies  to subsequent  economic  performance.
To fill this gap, a recent World Bank  study 2 eamined in depth how much adjustment
has taken place and how successful  it has been in African countries.  This study-Africa
Adjustment  Study (AAS)-compares  the policies  and performance  of 29 Sub-Saharan  African
countries during two periods: from 1981 to  1986, when most African countries  were in
economic  crisis, and from 1987  to 1991, when these counties adopted  structural  adjustment
programs. This study was supplemented  by case studies of seven countries' Burundi,  Cote
d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya,  Nigeria,  Senegal,  and Tanzania-that  undertook  adjustment  programs
during the mid-1980s. The period covered  by these case studies  ends, for most counties, in
1991. The countries  were chosen  to capture  a variety  of characteristics  and initial conditions.
In  all seven countries, adjustment  programs addressed such distortions as an overvalued
exchange  rte,  high current account  and fiscal deficits, low factor mobility, restrictions  on
domestic  and foreign  trade, distorted  pricing  for tadables, and inefficient  public services.
IThc author is the Chief Economist,  Africa Rcgion,  The World Bank. The views expressed in this paper are personal  and
should not be attributed  to the World  Bank, i;s Management or the Board of Dircctorx.
2Adjustment  in Afica:  Reforn,  Results and the Road Ahcad, World Bank, Oxford Univcrsity Press,  1994.
3 Husain,  1. and Faruqec.  R.,  1994,  Lessons from County  Case Studics, World  Bank Regional and Sectoml Studies.2
The AAS asks the question:  whether it is the failure of adjustment policies that has resulted in
such disappointing results for Africa or  is it the failure to adjust i.e.  the countries did not
implement  these policies consistently  and vigorously.
External  vs Internal  Factors
Before answering this question, the study revisited the issue of the main contributory
factor for Africa's economic decline.  If the main cause of the decline is external shocks, then
adjustment policies cannot be an effective answer to  the problem.  But if  domestic policy
weaknesses  are the main culprit, then altering these policies should make a difference.
The debate on the relative weight of  the factors explaining the poor performance of
Sub-Saharan  Africa  has been  lingering for  the past  fifteen  years.  The  Berg  report  of  1981
argued that the domestic policy failures of African governments were mainly responsible for
the continent's continuing decline, while the ECA and many other observers blamed the hostile
external environment as a significant source of Africa's malaise.
The AAS acknowledges  that the terms of trade decline -from  the early 1970s to the
mid 19SOs-had a negative influence on the economic  growth of the African countries but
accounted for a relatively small part (10 percent) of Africa's decline in the growth rate.  A
similar result was derived by El-Farhan, 4 who applied an OLS regession  model to cross
sectional data on 32 SSA countres  over  1960-86 in order  to test for various  influences  on
GDP growth in Sub-Saharan  Africa.  According to her study, changes in the commodity terms
of trade had the expected positive sign but were not found to be significant.  The strongest
explanatory  variable was the growth of export volume.  An analysis of SSA export
perfonnance by Svedberg 5 found term of trade movements (up or down) to be the main
influence on export earings  only in  11 out of 33 countries in 1970-85. Pickett assessed the
effects on GDP growth of long-run terms of trade for a sample of  20 SSA low income
countries over 1966-86. In all the 20 countries he examined, the income effects of the terms
of trade were negative, but in most cases the effect was quite modest.
4E2-Faxhan,  H., Analysis of the Gmwth  Performance  of Sub-Saharan  Africa  Countrics, London: SOAS  (Ph. D. Thcsis
Unpublished).
5Svedbcrg,  P., 1991, The Export Performance  of Sub-Saha  Africa",  in J.H. FzimpoW.Ansh, ct al., Tmde and
Development  ia SubSaharan Afric,  Manchester  V. Pess,  Manchester.
6Pickctt,  J.,  1990,  The  Low-Income  Economiw  of Sub-Sharan  Aica:  Piubkm and Pznap:ca",  in J. Picket?  and H. Singer
(cds.), Towards  Economic  Recovery in Sub-Sahe  Arica: London: Routhledge.3
The income loss from the decline in the terms of trade for the region (excluding
Nigeria) was around 10 percent of GDP between 1965-73  and 1987-90. Though large, the
loss was spread over 20 years.  Adding Nigeria to the picture reduces the 20 year loss to just
3.6 percent of GDP or 0.2 percent a year.  The reason for such an insignificant  contribution  of
terms of trade losses can be found in the composition  of exports.
In  terms of  the  composition of  Africa's  exports, there are  three  major commodity
groups that account for bulk of the export-oil  and gas (40 45%), metals and minerals (20-
25%) and agriculture (20-25%).  At this disaggregated level, the impact of the terms of trade
has been uneven and not necessarily in the same direction for oil exporters, mineral exporters
and agriculture exporters.  Between 1970 and 1990, oil exporters enjoyed improvements of
more than 100 percent while mineral exporters were hardest ht,  their terms of trade fell by
around 50  percent.  Agriculture exports suffered a  decline of  34 percent while the  more
diversified exports 30 percent.  Thus, at an aggregate level, the picture for the whole of .Sub-
Saharan Africa does not look as dismal as at the individual country level because the positive,
movement  in one commodity group neutralizes the negative movements  of the other groups.
At a country level, the situation is more differentiated.  Several countries that derive
their export revenues from coffee, cocoa and copper, whose prices were severly  depressed
over the decade of the 1980s and real prices had, in fact, dropped to the historically low levels
in the second half of the 1980s, were indeed badly hurt.
The AAS, therefore, concluded that poor economic policies played a bigger role in
explaining economic decline except a few cases.  The task of adjustment was, however, made
more difficult by larger terms of trade decline recorded in the period 1986-91. Tle  outcornes
would have been much more positive if the commodity prices had not fallen so precipitously,
debt burden had been reduced, and the Southern Africa had not faced a terrible drought
The Extent of Policy Reforms
The major contribution of the AAS was a careful measurement of the extent to which
six sets of  policy reforms-macroeconomic,  trade, agriculture,  public enterprise, financial
sector and public sector management-were  implemented in  the 29  countries in  the period
1986-91. The study 7 found:
7The first part of this section is drawn from  Jones, C. and Kiguel  M., 1994,  AMica's  Quest for Prosperity: Has Adjustment
Helped'. and the second pat  is based on Husain, 1., 1994 'Results of Adjustment  in Africa: Selected  Cases", in Finance  and
Dc"elcpmcnL4
Chart  I. More than half of adjusting countries improved their macroeconomic policies
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Index  scareS
Constructing an index of macroeconomic policy reforms for each country by  using
changes in inflation,  exchange rate and fiscal policy in the pre-adjustment  and adjustment
period, it  was found that  only six countries had  recorded a  large  improvement in
macroeconomics  policies,  nine a smal improvement  and eleven a deterioration  (Chart I).
Taken as a whole, countries in the CFA zone were the ones that had seen a deterioration
in their policies.
Many countries have substantially  reduced the number  of imports  subject  to non-tariff
barriers  and have begun  to rationalize  the tariff structure  to encourage  greater efficiency.
Most of the countries  with a flexible  exchange  rate have moved  to more automatic
systems  of granting foreign exchange  licenses.
*  Two-thirds  of the adjusting  countries  are taxing their farmers  less (Chart 1).  Despite  huge
declines  in real export prices, policy  changes  increased  real producer prices for agricultural
exporters in  10 countries.  Of the  15 govenmuents  that had major restrictions on the
private purchase, distribution and sale of major food crops before adjustment, 13 have
withdrwn  from marketing  almost  completely.
*  Less progress has been made in public  sector refonn.  The pace of privatiation has been
slow, with African  governments selling  off only a small portion of their assets.  Financial
flows to public enterprises  are still high, and overall performance  has not improved. One
encouraging trend, however, is that governments have stopped expanding their public
enterprise  sectors.
*  In the financial  sector, there has been progress in rationalizing  real interest rates and in
increasing private sector ownership in commercial banks.  Efforts to  restructure and
recapitalize  banks have been less successful,  however, as banks have continued to lend to
unhealthy  public  enterprises,  undermining  the sustainability  of the restructuring  efforts.
*  Civil  service reform, which was the main plank of public sector management  reforms,  had
not made much headway in improving  the efficiency  and productivity  of civil service even
where retrenchments  and reduction in the size of the force had been carried out in only a
few countnes.
To sum up, progress has been satisfactory  in the areas of macroeconomic  reforms, trade
policy and agriculture pricing and marketing.  Macroeconomic reforms have spurred extenal
competitiveness  while keeping inflation  low.  Trade reforms  have increased access to the imports
needed for  growth.  And  the  reduced taxation of  agriculture has helped the  poor  while
encouraging  production and exports6
Chart 11.  Seventeen Adjusting countries reduced overall taxation of agriculture
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For public  enterprises,  financial  sector and public  sector management,  there have been few
policy  changes. African  govemrnments  have  sold off or liquidated  only a small share of their assets.
Financial flows to  public enterprises are  still high but  there  has not  been any sustainable
improvement in their efficiency.  Financial sector is still heavily burdened by  public sector
demands for credit crowding out private sector.  Civil service efficiency  and productivity  has not
shown any perceptible  improvement.
The study found that despite these efforts to  improve the macroeconomic  environment,
open up markets and strengthen  the incentives  for production and exports, most African  countries
still lack policies  that are sound by international  standards. Even Africa's  best performers  have
worse macroeconomic  policies  than those foDlowed  on average by the economies in Asia.  The
credibility  of these policies  has not yet been established,  the ownership  and political  commitmenlt
are just beginning  to emerge  and fiscal  stability  is still fragile.
Results of Policy Refonus
The results of the study show that those countries  that have pursued adjustment  programs
in a consistent and sustained manner have shown positive results in terms of resurgence of
growth.  But it is equally  clear that many structural reforms  have yet to take place; consequently,
economic  recovery is still  fragile and economic  growth rates are still  insufficient  to make any dent
in poverty alleviation.
The group of countries that instituted  the most extensive  macroeconomic  reform policies
between 1981-86 and 1987-91 enjoyed a median increase  of GDP per capita growth of almost 2
percentage points.  By contrast, countries that did not improve their policies saw their median
GDP growth decline  by 2.6 percent. A simiar pattern is evident for export and industrial  growth.
As for agriculture, countries that taxed their major export crops less experienced a jump of 2
percentage points in the growth of total agricultural  value added, while countries that penalized
their fanners more saw agricultural  growth rates fall by 1.6 percentage points (Chart DI).
To the extent that macroeconomic  policies  matter-and they do-getting the exchange  rate
right is one of the top priorities for short-term growth.  Countries that significantly  reduced the
black market prernium  (by devaluing)  and adopted realistic macroeconomics  policies  enjoyed the
biggest payoffs (e.g.  Ghana, Nigeria, and  Tanzania).  Countries that  brought about a  real
depreciation of 40 percent or more between 1981-86 and  1987-91--all of them with flexible
exchange  rates-had  a median increase  in GDP per capita growth of 2.3  percentage points (e.g.,
The Gambia, Mauritania, and Sierra Leone).  Countries that had  appreciations--all of them with
fixed exchange rates-suffered a median decline of 1.7 percentage points (e.g. Cameroon, Cote
d'Ivoire, and Gabon) (Chart IV).
There were payoffs not only to improving  policies,  but also to maintaining  good policies.
Countries assessed as having adequate or fair macroeconomic  policies  had a median rate of GDP
per capita growth of 0.4 percent a year during 1987-91-low, but at least positive. By contrast, in
countries ranked as having  poor or very poor macroeconomic  policies, median GDP per capita
growth fell by 2.1 percentage points a year on average  (Chart V).II  X  I  a...  'I,  I  i  ' 
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CHART IV:  Economic  Performance  of  FiXed  and Flexible  Exchange  Rate Economies
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The extent of government intervention in markets also made a  difference in growth.
Countries  with limited  intervention  had median  GDP per capita growth of almost  2 percent during
1987-91,  compared with declines  of more than I percent for the countries that intervened more
extensively  (Chart V).
These countries' economic policies  have continued to evolve, of course, since the study
was completed  The recent devaluation in the CFA franc zone countries provides a unique
opportunity  for a rapid and noticeable  rebound in growth  Success,  however, largely depends on
whether (1) the devaluation  is accompanied  by supporting  fiscal and credit policies  to ensure that
it is not eroded by large increases  in domestic  prices, and (2) the benefits of the higher prices for
tradable goods are passed along to agriculture  producers, so that exports can become a dynamic
factor  and  energize growth.  Other  countries have  also  taken  steps  to  improve their
macroeconomic  policies  since 1991, notably  Mauritania,  Mozarnbique,  Sierra Leone; Uganda, and
Zambia.  But policies have worsened in Burundi and Nigeria, while Kenya has exhibited  both
backs'.ding  and improvement.
The  above  results  represent  the  average  or  median tendencies of  a  large  and
heterogeneous group of  SSA countries.  The case studies of seven countries were used to
explore, in depth, five questions that are raised most frequently  in connection with adjustment
programs.
How far have  these countries  come in refoming their policies  and what pay-offs  have they
earned by implementing  these refonns?  To  assess the extent of reform, and the  associated
outcomes, the study looked at the five questions that are raised most frequently in connection
with adjustment  programs: Has growth been adequate? Has the supply response been strong?
Do  investment-to-CDP ratios show improvement? What role has  been played  by  external
financialflows? And, have adjustment  policies hurt the  poor?.
Higher Growth.
All the countries studies, except for Cote dlvoire, experienced  positive per capita GDP
growth during  the adjustment  period 1986-91. The average growth rate of the six countries over
the adjustment period was 4.5 percent a year-strong  improvement compared to  an average
growth rate of 1 percent in the preceding  period (Chart VI).
Burundi and  Kenya, which had fairly  good initial  conditions,  maintained  their previous
growth rates. The biggest  turnarounds  during 1986-91  were registered in Nigeria, Ghana, and
Tanzania,  at 8.8 and 4 percentage points  respectively. Even Senegal  registered a small
tumaround in growth despite the handicap  of an overvalued  exchange  rate.  Cote d¶lvoire,  which
once had an impressive  growth rate, could not revert to its pre-cisis rate primarily  because of its
exchange  rate problems. A large devaluation  of the CFA fianc took place in January 1994,
removing  one of the principal  obstacles  to the fill interplay  of policy  instruments  required for
adjustmenti  i CFA fianc zone countries. It is hoped that Cote dIvoire and Senegal,  which have12
been adversely  affected  by the overvaluation  of the CFA franc  since 1985,  will enter into a new
period of adjustment.





T'he most important contributor to  domestic supply and output in the  region is thie
agricultural sector,  followed by  the  export  sector,  wlich  relies  heavily  on  the  agricultural
*.onunodities.  niining and petroleum.
Agricultural  Sector.  All  seven  countries  -showed significant output  increases-a  trend
c.orroborated by evidence on prices, food imports, and food production.  The index of per capita
food production rose in almost all countries (see Chart VII) except Tanzania, where the data are
inconsistent--flood imports and food prices both  show a  decline.  In Burundi  per  capita food
production seems to have stagnated, but at least kept pace with the population growth rate during
the 1980s.  Food prices in real tenns  declined in Nigeria.  Average food imports declined by 30
percent to 60 percent in Burundi  Kenyra,  Nigeria, and Tanzania, and rernained the same in Cote
d&Ivoire,  Ghana and Senegal.
The volume of cash crop exports grew rapidly in Burundi  Ghana, NMgeria,  Senegal, and
Tanzania - but declined in Cote dlvoire.  New non-traditional agricultural exports have emerged
in almost every country in this group, although the amounts are still modest.
Export sector.  Another good  indicator of the supply response is the behavior of total
exports.  The most consistent finding that  emnerges  from this study  (which is corroborated  by
other studies) is that export growth has been remarlcably  high despite declines in terms of trade,
exports  have not  only recovered  from the crisis period but  have also surpassed their pre-crisis
level (vsee  Chart VII).
The country case studies also investigated whether there was any diversification in exports
from  traditional  commnodities.  Oil  still dominates  Nigerian  exports,  and  even the  anecdotal13
evidence on Nigerian unofficial exports of  manufactured goods to  neighboring countries is
fragmentary,  preventing  any definite  conclusion. But unlike the early 1980s, Nigerian  goods are
now competing with other imports in the West Afiican markets.  Despite a sharp fail in cocoa
prices  in the world market, Ghana  has more than doubled  its exports in the past seven years, with
gold exports replacing  cocoa as the number one export.  Today, at least 20 percent of Ghana's
export earnings  come from products other than cocoa, gold, and timber, compared with 8 percent
a  decade ago.  Tanzania shows the  largest documented rise in  non-traditional exports; its
unrecorded exports are estimated at about $400-500 million  a year.  Cote dvloire, Kenya, and
Senegal have export bases that are among the most diversified  in Africa, but changes during
adjustment  have been minor and show no persistent  trend. Burundi  is the only country among  the
seven to show continuing  heavy reliance on coffee; its present diversification  efforts, have been
negligible.
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Investment Responds Slowly
Despite increased  inflows  of foreign  savings,  public  investment  has fallen  in relation to
GDP in all seven countries,  recovering  to pre-crisis  levels  only in Tanzania  (see Chart XX).  In the
short run, the slowdown  in public  investment-in an attempt to reduce budget deficits  and to cut
uneconomic  projects-without a compensating  rise in private
Chart  IX: InvestmentIGDP
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investment, would result in  depressing overall investment ratios.  The conditions needed to
encourage  private investors have generally  been lacldng so this slow response is understandable.
The relatively  low investment  rate is not a major obstacle  to restoring growth in the short
term as long as the efficiency  of investment compensates  for the low levels.  After all, despite
much higher pre-crisis investment  rates, these countries did not grow fhster because of the poor
quality of the investments. "White elephant" projects, infated contracts, flight capital, and other
associated  ills became rampant before-and eventually  contributed to-the  crisis in each case.  A
major aim of adjustment  programs,  therefore, has been to weed out these undesirable  investments
(particularly in the  public sector) and to  improve overall efficiency.  Indeed, roughly similar
investment  ratios generated 1 percentage point of annual growth in the crisis  period but close to 5
percentage points in the adjustment  period.
A crucial issue is how long it will be before private investment will pick up the slack
caused by this slowdown  in public investment. The evidence so far is not reassuring. Domestic
investors have been deterred in the short run by changes taking place as a result of restrictive
monetary policies, high interest rates, devaluations-which  increase the cost of imported inputs-
and trade liberalization. Foreign investors appear yet to be convinced  that African econonues
offer good  investment prospects.  The country studies confirm the vital  importance of the
stability, continuity, and credibility  of policies  for providing the appropriate signals to  domestic
and foreign investors. Of the seven countries, Ghana and-untl  recently-Kenya came closest to15
meeting  this objective,  but could have achieved  more. If the Ghanaian  authorities'  general attitude
toward the private sector in the past had been less ambivalent,  Ghana, no doubt would have seen
a greater revival  of private investment. In Kenya, the lack of transparent policies  and the general
perception of poor governance discouraged potential investors, even though Kenya had a more
stable economic  environment  than other countries in this sample.
External  Flows
The three main mechanisms through which the external economic environment affects
African countries are: (1) the terms of trade, (2) the debt-servicing  burden, and (3)  external
resource transfers.
Six of the seven countries  studied  had a decline  in the tenns of trade during  the adjustment
period--both in absolute terms but also relative to the pre-adjustment  period.  How far was this
decline in external income offset by net external transfers-aid flows, debt-servicing  relief, and
accumulation  of arrears--during  the period of adjustment  relative  to the earlier period? Tanzania
was by far the largest beneficiary  of positive net external transfers that not only wiped out the
terms of trade losses but resulted in a significant  increase in net external flows. Burundi, Ghana,
and Kenya were able to neutralize the terms of trade losses and had some modest overall gain.
Nigeria suffered the most through termis  of trade losses compounded by net negative transfers.
Cote dIvoire and Senegal  also incurred  net declines  in extemal flows.
The central  question is how much of the renewed  growth of the adjusting  countries  can be
ascribed to external factors-aid  and terms of trade changes-and how much to  policy reform.
The case studies reached  the following  conclusions:
. Nigeria has done much better despite tenns of trade losses and net negative flows of
external resources.  Since net resource transfers from Nigeria to  its external creditors
equaled  about 5 percent of its GDP every year, its growth could have been even higher if
it were not so heavily  burdened  with debt.
*  Cote dIvoire has been hurt by terms of trade losses and a relative decline in external
flows, as well as by poor policies. Cote dIvoire is also severely indebted but has avoided
a cash flow crunch by not paying  all its creditors and by accumulating  arrears. It is hoped
that this situation  will change  because of the 1994 devaluation  of the CFA franc and there
accompanying  measures.
. Burundi, Ghana, and Kenya-until recently-and Senegal, are among a select group of
African countries that are fMlly  servicing  their debt-all  four have been hurt by terms of
trade losses. The gross flows appear  large in each one of these but when they are adjusted
for the debt service paid and terms of trade losses, the "net external resource availability"
indicator does not appear large. Kenya's growth record reflects some positive impact of
adjustment. Clearly,  Ghana's growth turnaround was due far more to better policies  than
to the other changes.16
Tanzania's  growth can be attributed to factors other than aid.  Generally  perceived  as
highly dependent on  external donors, Tanzania has received very large sums of aid
historically.  But once debt-servicing  and terms of trade losses are accounted  for, the real
external resource flows to Tanzania during its adjustment are no different  in absolute
terms from those during  its crisis. However,  this high level  of external  assistance  is clearly
not sustainable  in the long run.  Tanzmia has to mobilize  a larger volume of domestic
savings through improved management  of public finances and financial  intermediation.
External  resources can fill in the gaps temporarily,  and then only  to a limited  extent.
Adjustment and the Poor
While  the early  generation  of adjustnent programs  might  not have explicitly  addressed  the
consequences  of reform on the poor, the subsequent  awareness  of these issues has changed the
approach  of adjustment  efforts. An important  finding  of the study is that adjustment  has generally
improved  the welfare  of the nrul poor while  most likely  hurting  the urban poor. More disturbing
however,  is the fact that the growth attained thus far as a result of adjustnent policies  is still  not
enough to reduce the incdence of poverty.  Unless growth rates are accelerated  to an annual
average  of 6-7 percent,  the prospects  for poverty  alleviation  in Afiica are likely  to remain  dim.
Ruralpoor.  In all seven  countries,  the majority  of the poor who live  in the rural areas, are
smallholders  and self-employed,  and derive their incomes from producing and marketing  both
food and export crops. Because six of the countries  (Cote d'Tvoire  in the second half of the 1980s
is an exception) had an improvement  in the rural terms of trade-as  a result of devaluation,
liberalized  marketing, higher producer prices, and lower taxes--the rural poor appear to  have
benefited  from real income gains over an extended period.  Export crop and particularly  non-
traditional  export crop producers,  have gained  more than other agricultural  producers. Real food
prices to  faners  have declined in many countries, but the  marketed output has increased,
replacing  food imports in many cases.  The real income gains to  fbod producers have varied.
Those in Ghana,  Nigeria  and Tanzaiia seem  to have benefited  the most. Burundi  and Kenya have
been self-sufficient  in food, and, therefore, the food crop farmers there have not gained much.
The situation  in Cote dlvoire and Senegal  is still  unclear.
Urbanpoor.  The impact  on the urban poor has been mixed. In Ghana and Tanzania,  the
urban poor have been better off after adjustment  as consumer  goods have  become available,  real
food prices have declined,  and informal  sector activities  have expanded.  To the extent that the
urban poor were buying their essential goods (mcluding  food) on the  black market before
adjustment,  there has been no change  in the welfare  of this group.
In Cote dlvoire and Senegal  the urban poor were worse ofE This would also seem to be
the case for the unemployed,  fixed-income  eamers, and minimum  wage earners in Nigeria.
Because there are no data on Burundi and Kenya, it is unclear whether the real incomes of the
urban  poor in those  countries  have  worsened  or improved.
More recent empirical  measures  of poverty incidence  in Kenya, Tanzania,  Cote d'Ivoire
and Ghana shed some  light on the impact  of economic  reforms  on poverty reduction. In the case17
of Cote d'Ivoire,  household  data from the Living  Standards  Surveys  show that the proportion of
households  living  below  the poverty  line  increased  from 30 percent in 1985  to 46 percent in 1988,
a  period in which adjustment effort was abandoned and per capita incomes declined by  12
percent.  A decomposition  analysis separating the growth component from the distribution
component, showed that the declines in GNP during this period were the  most important
determinants  of poverty  in Cote d'Ivoire. If mean household  expenditure  had remained  constant
during 1985-88,  poverty  would have fallen  by 20 percent. But because GDP declined  under an
abandoned adjustment  effort, the number of people living in extreme poverty increased by 57
percent.
A study 8 comparing  the 1983  (a year of economic  crisis)  and 1991  (a year of adjustment)
Household Surveys  fbr Tanzania  found that growth had benefitted  the population  in general and
had shifted  a significant  proportion of the population  from below the poverty line to above the
poverty  line. The incidence  of poverty  declined  to 41.8 percent in 1991  compared  to 53.8 percent
in 1983.  The absolute number of people living below the poverty line also declined from 8.9
million  to  8 million  in the same period despiw-  a population  growth rate of 3 percent annually
Other studies carried  out by independent  researchers  and aid agencies  confirm  the above  finding.
In Kenya, 9 the decade of the 80s saw no change in the incidence  of poverty  in rural areas
and the percentage of the population  under the absolute poverty line remained  virtualy constant
at about 47 percent in 1981/82  and 1992. Overall,  per capita real consumption  expenditure  in
rural areas increased  at 13 percent per year. However,  the distribution  of expenditures  worsened
with the gini coefficient  increasing  from 0.45 percent  to 0.49 percent. Kenya at the outset of the
1980s  already  had more fivorable social indicators  than most countries  in the regiona Infat  and
child mortality rates continued to fill and there was firther progress in life expectancy. Kenya
had achieved  nearly  universal  primary  school enrollment  by the early SOs,  a situation  experienced
in the early  90s as well.
Ghana has completed surveys  of the living  standards for three different  years during the
period of adjustment.1 0 The results of these surveys show  that at the national  level, the average
household  welfare levels  fell by 5.9 percent between 1987/88  and 1988/89  but increased  by 10.9
percent between 1988/89 and  1991/92, the  increase between the  later  period more than
compensated  for the earlier decline. The incidence  of poverty  therefore declined  from 43 percent
in 1987/88  to 40 percent in 1991/92. The depth of poverty, however, does not display  such a
strong  trend and the magnitude  of the decline  is relatively  small.
At a disaggregated  level, average  welfare  has improved, and the incidence  and depth of
poverty  have  declined  more significantly  ir. the nrral coastal,  and  ural forest and urban  areas other
than Accra. There is hardly any change in the measure of incidence  in the rural savannah  areas
but the depth of poverty has declined  slightly  while  the incidence  of  poverty has increased  in the
ZFereira, L. 1994 "Poverty  and Inequaliy during Structul  Adjustment  in Ruxal  Tavzamia'  World  Bank,  Policy  Research
Departent  Tmnsition Economics  Division,  Research  Paper  S.
9Kenya: Povcrty  Assssmcnt (World  Bank, 1994,  Draft)
'0GhanE  Poverty Assessment  (under  prepamtion)l8
Accra  area.
An interesting  result of the Ghana study is that the incidence  of poverty has declined
during  this four year period for both food and export farmers. The popular perception  that it is
only the export crop fanners who benefit from devaluation  and agriculture  price liberalization  is
not bome out by the empirical  evidence  of Ghana.
Lessons Learnt
Why have some countries  among the adjusters been more successfil than others facing
identical  circumstances  and similar  constraints?  It would  be foolhardy  to make generalizations  but
there is sufficient  accumulated  evidence  to suggest  a few answers.
First, the "ownership"  and "'commitment"  of the govermment  and the population  of the
country  to the program, including  the willingness  to sustain  the policies  in the face of pains and
transitional  costs, are positively related to  the successful  outcomes.  Any amount of outside
interference,  coercing  or coaxing  by foreign  donors and international  financial  institutions  will not
eivp  in the absence of internal consensus.  A number of countries have not filly comnmitted
themselves  to reforms  and have adopted a stop-and-go  stance. This half-hearted  and haphazard
implementation  of refbrms,  without having  arrived at a broaJ internal  consensus,  is not likely  to
create any positive durable effects.  Adjustment  programrs  should be owned by the adopting
gov-rnment  and not perceived  to be imposed  by outsiders. Adjustment  programs  usually  involve
up-front costs to many groups in society and the benefits usually take time to  emerge.  This
ccmplicates  the tasks of many governments  in securing a  domestic constituency.  But to  be
effective,  reforms  must be followed  through  and sustained  despite  the short-term  transitional  costs
they impose upon some vocal segments  of the society.  Reversing or switching  gears in mid-
stream also reduces the credibility  of subsequent  adjustment  efforts. The lack of credibility  and
continuity  in government  policies  have been more hamiful  than if adjustment  policies  were not
put in place in the first instance,  as uncertainty  among economic  agents and investors paralyzes
the initiation  of new economic  activity.
Second, achieving macroecononic stability i.e.  avoiding overvalued exchange rates,
keeping inflation and budget deficits low  is  essential for  reviving growth  and  attracting
investment. Progress in maintaining  realistic exchange rate has been satisfilctory. But most
countries  in the region still need  to cut budget deficits  and indirect  fiscal  losses (those covered  by
the banking system)  in order to lessen the need for inflationaiv  financing  or additional  external
financing. More needs to be done to increase  savings. Eliminating  large negative real interest
rates is an important step; however, given the difficulty  of obtaining rapid growth in private
savings,  raising  public  saving  is the best option in the short run.
Third; adjustment  policies,  if effectively  implemented,  are a necessary  but not sufficient
condition for accelerated  growth.  Growth in Africa requires the same incentives  for efficiency
and productivity  growth as elsewhere,  though special  support is required  for the development  of
human resources and strengthening  of institutions.  The level and efficiency  of investment andchanges  in  institutions  and  administrative Capacity should  improve  substantially--either
accompanying  or closely following  the policy changes.  Equally true, investment projects will
yield poor results if the policy  climate is highly  cistorted. The interaction  between an undistorted
policy regime and successful investment  projects is an important lesson.  In countries where
macroeconomic  stability  has been achieved,  supply response will occur if investment  levels are
raised, composition  of investment  is rightly  targeted and efficiency  of investment  is improved.
Fourth,  discrimination against the  agriculture sector  is inimical to  both  growth  and
poverty alleviation. Although  implicit  and explicit  taxation of farmers  has beeii reduced in a large
number of countries, the scope for continuing  reforms in this sector is still large.  Liberalizing
pricing and marketing of export and food crops has not made headway in several countries.  In
mary cases, there is no clear rationale for agricultural marketing parastatals, and they can be
elininated as barriers to private sector entry are removed. These reforms  can help farmers reap
the full benefit of the exchange rate depreciations,  the additional earnings from which might
otherwise  be used to shore up the financial  position of parastatals. The rising  incomes  in the rural
sector can provide  a durable  basis for industrial  growth.
Fjfih, export promotion has not been given sufficient  attention as yet.  Countries should
seek  to  remove  unnecessary policy  and  administrative impediments that  hinder  export
competition.  Providing exporters with automatic access to  imports and  foreign exchange,
eliminating  export monopolies, and facilitating  access to intermediate inputs and capital goods
would reduce bias against exporters.  Direct government promotion of particular exports or
exporters is not indicated, given the difficulty  of insulating  technocratic  decisions from political
considerations.
Sixth, the enablig  enviromnent  for private sector development  is not yet in place in many
adjusting countries.  Preferential treatment for parastata!s, labor market rigidities, regulatory
barriers, financial  sector inefficiencies  and the hostile attitude of the govermments  towards private
profit  maximization have  not  changed  significantly.  The  credibility and  continuity  of
macroeconomic  policies  are seriously questioned and therefore do not provide much comfort to
prospective  investors.
Seventh, most important, protecting  the poor in the transitional  stages of reform process
should be an explicit objective of adjustment program.  linprovements  in macroeconomic  and
agricultural  sector policies  in Sub-Saharan  African  countries should  help to foster a more broadly
based labor-intensive  patterns of growth beneficial  to the poor, the vast majority  of whom live in
the rural sector. However, reforms  that have improved  producer incentives  have sometimes  had
negative consequences for those  consumers who benefited from food  subsidies and  cheap
imported  foodstuffs. While  evidence  on the incidence  of these subsidies  is limited,  indications  are
that subsidized  foodstuffs  were often highly  rationed and did not extend to the poor, limiting  the
potentially  negative impact  of these reforms.
Eight, Africa needs debt stock reduction.  As countries adopt better policies, the  debt
overhang  is likely  to deter private investment. Further, the debt-service  burden threatens to eat
away at increased  export earnings  and domestic  savings  that night otherwise  be used in pursuit of20
long-term development  objectives. Even the proposed debt relief strategies under consideration
would leave some countries with an unsustainable  debt burden. Instead, the focus should be on
reducing  the stock of debt to sustainable  levels for countries  that are undertaking  comprehensive
and  sustained policy reform programs, even if  that means differences in  treatment  across
countries.
Unresolved Issues
The progress made so far has been uneven and ni-xed  but the future agenda is even more
difficult  due to the existence  of several unresolved  issues. There are a number of concerns that
characterize the  future course of adjustment programs, a  number of trade-offs and difficult
choices that need to be made by the governments,  several  tensions that need to be defused and,
therefore, a whole host of challenges Z.hat  have to  be faced.  There are,  at least, four tough
challenges  that involve  these trade-oils and choices.
The first and foremost challenge  is whether the respective  roles of the state and private
sector are to be clearly  defined  and demarcated  or left ambiguous  as before. There is a need in
depth how much adjustment  has taken place and how successful  it has been in African  countries.
This study-Africa Adjustment  Study (AAS)-compares the policies  and performance  of 29 Sub-
Saharan African  countries  during two periods: from 1981  to 1986, when most African  countries
were in economic  crisis, and from 1987  to 1991,  when these countries  adopted structural
adjustment  programs. This study was supplemented  by case studies of seven  countrieslBurundi,
Cote d¶voire, Ghana,  Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal,rnments  to guide resource allocation  with
administrative  measures  rather than leave  it to market mechanisms  is still  much stronger and
politically  attractive,  despite the evidence  that the results of direct government  allocations  have
been dismal  in most African  countries. As Jeffrey  Herbst" argues, overvalued  exchange  rates,
excessive  state intervention  and inefficient  parastatal companies  were not irrational  "distortions'
for those who intent on staying  in power, only for the development  of the population  as a whole.
Direct state intervention  is used for resources to flow to constituencies  important  to the
politicians'  continued  tenure in office. There is not much evidence,  as yet, that this propensity  has
been checked  or is on decline.
The recent debate about the causes of the success of the East Asian countries  has renewed
the call by  a group of intellectuals  and NGOs for greater govermnent interventions  in directing
credit, subsidies,  foreign exchange in promoting industrial  development  The misery and failure
this strategy has caused during the last twenty-five  years does not seem to have sunk in.  This
tension between the direct role of the state and the indirect and supportive role in the allocation
resources remains a thorny issue.
The  second  challenge, related to  the  first, is  to  develop better  adnministrative  and
institutional capacity in  order  to  deliver  essential social  services,  maintain and  operate
infrastructure facilities,  protect environment  and alleviate  poverty.  A greater participation  by the
IlHarbst, 1., i990,  "Structunl  Reform  and Dcbt in Africa",  in R. O'Brien and L [verson (cds.), Finance  and the Intemalional
Economy:  3, Oxford University Press, Oxford.21
other segments  of the civil society  winl  very much help in achieving  this objective.
Civil se-vice reform undertaken in  several African countries for fiscal and budgetary
reasons has not yet enhanced  the productivity or efficiency  of the civil service to  discharge  the
important functions assigned to  it.  The dilemma facing the countries is how to trim the civil
service while, at the same time, improving the incentives  and motivation for them to perform
better.
The third challenge is to  resolve the tension between the fear of domination by ethnic
minorities and the urge to  attract new private investment for expanding the productive base,
creating job opportunities and reducing dependence  on externaL  official aid.  Other developing
countries have successfully  resolved  this tension and Africa should  be able to find some politically
viable  and economically  feasible  solutions.
In several non-African  countries, the first thing that has been introduced is to remove the
barriers  for entry to new comers, enforce a hard budget constraint and create a level playing  field
for both private and public firms.  But in Africa, implicit  subsidies  and differential  privileges  to
public  enterprises have been maintained  to protect employment. A choice is to be made whether
these enterprises should  be restructured or shut down if they cannot compete with private firns in
the same sector of activity.  On the other hand, private finns will not become profitable, and,
hence,  not invest unless  the preferred  treatment to public  enterprises ceases  to exdst.
Fourth, the quality of growth, i.e. broad-based equitable  growth, will very much depend
whether the govemments are able to allocate scarce public resources increasingly  to  appease a
small privileged  group of population  that benefit from the rent-seeldng  opportunities  and contacts
with the  political and bureaucratic leadership, or  redirect these resources to  a  much larger
segment of the poor i.e., priry  educationt,  small and micro enterprises.  The powerful lobby
groups, such as university students or trade unions, who benefit from the existing pattern of
allocation of government expenditures  (stipends and subsidies  to public enterprises),  can, in fhct,
destabilize  the governments if their perceived interests are hurt.  On the other hand, the likely
beneficiaries  of the pro-poor expenditure  pattern will emerge in the next generation and not in the
present period.22
Conclusions
Despite satisfactory performance  on the part of several intensely  adjusting countries, and
particularly successful  results in agriculture and food production, it must be conceded that the
overall results of adjustment achieved so far have been modest relative to original expectations.
Adjustment  has not yet succeeded  in raising  the rate of growth to levels needed to make major
inroads into poverty.  Region-wide,  econormc  recovery is still fragile, although there is a great
deal of variation in outcomes. Currency  depreciation  and inflationary  pressures have not yet been
fully subdued in several countries due to  persistence of  underlying  expansionary fiscal and
monetary policies.  Many countries still rely exclusively on  external grants and concessional
financing to  close their fiscal gaps.  Per  capita consumption remains stagnant and private
investment  has not yet revived. Unemployment  rates, particularly  in urban areas, are still high and
poverty is on the rise. When there is civil strife, adjustment  has, of course, not worked.
There is a general consensus  that consistent and unfettered implementation  of adjustment
policies  and attainment of macroeconomic  stability do irnprove  the outlook for growth in these
countries. However, the record of implementation  is mixed  and uneven in Africa. Adjustment  is
necessary  even if it is bound to work slowly. But for it to work at all depends upon the strong
commitment  by the leadership  of the countries  to sustain reform  policies  in the face of adverse and
harsh external  circumstances  and domestic  political  pressures.
What is  less clear, and thus invokes a  lot  of  controversy is the  speed, timing and
sequencing of various components of adjustment programs.  As each refonn has differential
impact on the various segments of the population, creating winners and losers, the process of
mediating among these conflicting  claims is highly political. No technocratic solutions or quick
fixes can be found to provide satisfactory  solutions. No amount of external assistance  can help in
this process.  Consensus  building and open communication,  consultations  and debate among the
various groups and reaching compromises  will bring about the durable  results. But in practice this
path has proved difficult.
It is equally clear that adjustment  policies, even when they are put in place after reaching
internal consensus,  will not be able, by themselves,  to lift African  countries out of poverty.  The
agenda of policy reforms should be considered as part of the broader long-term development
strategy of each country.  This strategy should aim at not orly  changes in policies, but also
improve investment  in human resources and physical in--structure,  accelerate opportunities for
development of  private  sector,  enhance the  qualitv  ,f  govemance, strengthen institutional
capacity,  and, most importantly,  maintain  national solidarity  and social  cohesion.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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